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Abstract
There are two notions in the philosophy of probability that are
often used interchangeably: that of subjective probabilities and that
of epistemic probabilities. This paper suggests they should be kept
apart. Specifically, it suggests that the distinction between subjective
and objective probabilities refers to what probabilities are, while the
distinction between epistemic and ontic probabilities refers to what
probabilities are about. After arguing that there are bona fide exam-
ples of subjective ontic probabilities and of epistemic objective prob-
abilities, I propose a systematic way of drawing these distinctions in
order to take this into account. In doing so, I modify Lewis’s notion of
chances, and extend his Principal Principle in what I argue is a very
natural way (which in fact makes chances fundamentally conditional).
I conclude with some remarks on time symmetry, on the quantum
state, and with some more general remarks about how this proposal
fits into an overall Humean (but not quite neo-Humean) framework.
I believe I first met Itamar Pitowsky in what I think was the spring of 1993,
when he came to spend a substantial sabbatical period at Wolfson College,
Cambridge, while writing his paper on George Boole’s ‘Conditions of Possi-
ble Experience’ (Pitowsky 1994). At that time, the Cambridge group was
by far one of the largest research groups in philosophy of physics worldwide,
and Wolfson had the largest share of the group. Among others, that included
two further Israelis, my friends and fellow PhD-students Meir Hemmo, who is
co-editing this volume, and Jossi Berkovitz, who had worked under Itamar’s
supervision on de Finetti’s probabilistic subjectivism and its application to
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quantum mechanics (published in English as Berkovitz 2012). We were all
lunch regulars at Wolfson, and discussions on the philosophy of physics, of
probability, and of mathematics were thus not limited to the setting of the Fri-
day seminars in the HPS department (or the immediately preceding lunches
at the Eraina Taverna).
My earliest introduction to de Finetti’s subjectivism was in fact through Ita-
mar and Jossi, and Itamar’s seminal work on quantum probability (Pitowsky
1989, 1994) looms large within my formative years. The present paper relates
most closely to Itamar’s more recent work on Bayesian quantum probabilities
(Pitowsky 2003, 2007). I shall not be agreeing with Itamar on everything,
but that fits into the wider spirit of friendship, co-operation, integrity, and
pursuit of knowledge that makes philosophers of physics an ideal model of an
academic community, and Itamar an ideal model of a philosoper of physics.
I dedicate this paper to his memory.
1 Subjective or epistemic probabilities?
This paper is about the notion of subjective probabilities and that of epis-
temic probabilities, and of how to keep them apart. Since terminology varies,
I should briefly sketch which uses of the terms I intend. (A fuller explication
will be given in Sections 2 and 3.)
I take the use of the term ‘subjective probability’ to be fairly uniform in
the literature, and to be fairly well captured by the idea of degrees of belief
(and as such ‘assigned by agents’ and presumably ‘living in our heads’), as
opposed to some appropriate notion of objective probabilities (‘out there’),
sometimes cashed out in terms of frequencies or propensities. I shall take the
standard explication of the latter to be the one given by David Lewis with
his notion of chance (Lewis 1985).
Along these lines, all probability assignments can be taken as subjective in
the first place, but some such assignments may correspond to objective prob-
abilities ‘out there’ in the world, determined by actual matters of fact. Prob-
ability assignments that do not correspond to objective probabilities shall be
termed ‘purely’ or ‘merely’ subjective in the following. In this terminology,
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the subjective probabilities of a subjectivist like de Finetti, for whom objec-
tive probabilities do not exist, are the prime example of purely subjective
probabilities, even though usually they will be firmly if pragmatically rooted
in matters of actual fact (as further discussed in Sections 4 and 10).
The term ‘epistemic probabilities’ has a wider variety of meanings, of which
two are probably dominant, depending on whether one emphasises the fact
that we lack knowledge of something or whether one emphasises the knowl-
edge that we do have. The one I shall focus on is the former, that of
ignorance-interpretable probabilities (i.e. of probabilities attaching to propo-
sitions expressing a matter of fact, but whose truth is unknown), which is
perhaps most common in the philosophy of physics. The other refers to prob-
ability assignments whose values reflect our state of knowledge. The classical
notion of probability based on the principle of indifference or an objective
Bayesian view based on the principle of maximum entropy (to which we shall
presently return) can thus also be termed epistemic.
This second notion of ‘epistemic probabilities’, which is perhaps most com-
mon in the philosophy of probability, belongs somewhere along the axis
between subjective and objective probabilities. It is often contrasted with
subjective probabilities when these are understood as merely ‘prudential’ or
‘pragmatic’ or ‘instrumental’. This distinction is challenged by Berkovitz
(2019), who convincingly argues that de Finetti’s instrumental probabilities
are also epistemic in this sense. Indeed, when talking about subjective prob-
abilities in Sections 4, 6 and 10, I shall always implicitly take them to be so.
This second sense of ‘epistemic probabilities’ is not the topic of this paper,
and will be discussed no further.
Epistemic probabilities in the sense of ignorance-interpretable ones instead
are liable to be assimilated to subjective probabilities, but, as I shall argue,
they ought not to, because the distinction between probabilities that are
epistemic in this sense and those that are not (we shall call them ‘ontic’) is
conceptually orthogonal to the subjective-objective distinction.
Take for example Popper’s discussion in Vol. III of the Postscript (Popper
1982).1 After treating extensively of his propensity interpretation in Vol. II,
Popper starts Vol. III (on quantum mechanics) with a discussion of subjec-
1Incidentally, reviewed by Itamar when it came out (Bub and Pitowsky 1985). Note
that my examples of possible assimilation or confusion between epistemic and subjective
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tive vs objective probabilities, complaining that physicists conflate the two
(especially in quantum mechanics). Popper’s contrast for the objective view
of probabilities is what he throughout calls the subjective view, which for
him is the view that probabilistic statements are about our (partial) igno-
rance. In the case of classical statistical mechanics, he complains that ‘[t]his
interpretation leads to the absurd result that the molecules escape from our
bottle because we do not know all about them’ (Popper 1982, p. 109).
True, we care about whether our coffee goes cold, and the coffee does not
care about our feelings. And, at least in the sense in which Popper took
his own notion of propensities to be explanatory of observed frequencies (cf.
Bub and Pitowski 1985, p. 541), it seems reasonable to say that while the
behaviour of the coffee is a major factor in explaining why we come to have
certain subjective expectations, it is only objective probabilities that can
explain the behaviour of the coffee. But there is also a sense in which the
probabilities of (classical) statistical mechanics are clearly epistemic: we do
believe the coffee or the gas in the bottle to be in a definite microstate, but
we do not know it. Also the statistical mechanical description of the gas
presupposes there to be a particular matter of fact about the state of the
molecules, which is however left out of the description. If we read Popper’s
complaint as being that epistemic probabilities must be subjective, or rather
purely subjective (i.e. unrelated to objective probabilities), then it seems that
no explanation of the kind Popper envisages is possible at all in statistical
mechanics.
Or take Jaynes, e. g. in ‘Some Random Observations’ (1985). For Jaynes
all probabilities are fundamentally subjective in the sense that ‘a probability
is something that we assign in order to represent a state of knowledge’, as
opposed to an actual frequency, which is a ‘factual property of the real world’
(p. 120). While for Jaynes the probabilities of classical statistical mechanics
are thus of course epistemic, unlike for Popper they are meant to be (at
least partially?) objective, in the sense that there are (rational?) principles,
first and foremost the principle of maximum entropy, that provide a way for
probabilities (in the senses just sketched) may well prove to be straw-mannish under
further scrutiny, but I just wish to make a prima facie case that these two notions can
indeed be confused. The rest of the paper will make the extended case for why we should
distinguish them and how.
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choosing our probability assignments based on those facts we do know.2
Part of Jaynes’s motivation came from the complaint that the mathematics
of quantum theory ‘describes in part physical law, in part the process of
human inference, all scrambled together in such a way that nobody has seen
how to separate them’ (p. 123). He continues:
Many years ago I became convinced that this unscrambling would
require that probability theory itself be reformulated so that it
recognizes explicitly the role of human information and thus re-
stores the distinction between reality and our knowledge of reality,
that has been lost in present quantum theory.3
Jaynes’ position, however, faces a different problem precisely in the case of
quantum mechanics. Whether or not probabilities are purely subjective, for
Jaynes they are always epistemic: ‘[p]robabilities in present quantum theory
express the incompleteness of human knowledge just as truly as did those in
classical statistical mechanics’ (1985, p. 122). And this ominously leads him
to question the possibility of fundamental indeterminism.
2It is unclear to what extent this ‘objective Bayesian’ strategy indeed yields objective
probabilities. Consider for instance situations in which information about the physical
situation is in principle readily available but is glibly ignored. In this case, even if we use
principles such as maximum entropy, one might complain that there is little or no connec-
tion between the physical situation and the probabilities we assign. On the other hand,
there may be situations in which the physical situation itself appears to systematically lead
to situations of ignorance, e.g. because of something like mixing properties of the dynamics.
In this case, there may arguably be a systematic link between certain objective physical
situations and certain ways of assigning probabilities, which may go some way towards
justifying the claim that these probabilities are objective. (Cf. discussions about whether
high-level probabilities are objective, e.g. Glynn (2009), Lyon (2011), Emery (2013) and
references therein.) If so, note that this will be the case whether or not there is anyone to
assign those probabilities. Many thanks to Jossi Berkovitz for discussion of related points.
3For an example of what Jaynes has in mind, see Heisenberg’s ‘The Copenhagen in-
terpretation of quantum theory’ (Heisenberg 1958, Chap. 3). In Section 9 below, I shall
allude to what I think are the origins of these aspects of Heisenberg’s views, but I agree
with Jaynes that (at least in the form they are usually presented) they are hard to make
sense of. Note also that ‘the Copenhagen interpretation’ as publicised there appears to
have been largely a (very successful) public relations exercise by Heisenberg (cf. Howard
2004). In reality, physicists like Bohr, Heisenberg, Born and Pauli held related but distinct
views about how quantum mechanics should be understood.
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Indeed, as Jaynes sees it, in the case of quantum mechanics human knowledge
is limited by dogmatic adherence to indeterminism in the Copenhagen inter-
pretation. But in fact, even though the ‘Copenhagen interpretation’ may
have been dogmatic, indeterminism was the least worrying of its dogmas: a
wide spectrum of non-dogmatic approaches to the foundations of quantum
mechanics today embrace indeterminism in some form or other. Thus, if
(as Jaynes seems to think) subjective probabilities must be epistemic, then
they seem to be inappicable to many if not most fundamental approaches to
quantum mechanics.4
These problems with both Popper’s and Jaynes’ positions seem to me to stem
from a scrambling together of subjective and epistemic probabilities. I shall
take it as uncontroversial that we often form degrees of belief about facts we
do not know (so that such probabilities are both subjective and epistemic),
but this in itself does not show that all epistemic probabilities should be
subjective, or that all subjective probabilities should be epistemic. Indeed,
being a degree of belief is conceptually distinct from being a probability about
something we ignore: the characterisation of a probability as subjective is
in terms of what that probability is, that of a probability as epistemic is in
terms of what that probability is about.
Admittedly, even if we can conceptually distinguish between subjective and
epistemic probabilities, it could be that the two categories are coextensive.
And if all epistemic probabilities are merely subjective, or all subjective
probabilities are also epistemic, then Popper’s or Jaynes’s worries become
legitimate again. As a matter of fact, typical cases of epistemic probabilities
are arguably subjective (‘Is Beethoven’s birthday the 16th of December?’5),
and, say, probabilities in plausibly indeterministic scenarios are typically
4Spontaneous collapse approaches are invariably indeterministic (unless one counts
among them also non-linear modifications of the Schro¨dinger equation, which however
have not proved successful), as is Nelson’s stochastic mechanics. Everett’s theory vindi-
cates indeterminism at the emergent level of worlds. And even many pilot-wave theories are
stochastic, namely those modelled on Bell’s (1984) theory based on fermion number den-
sity. Thus, among the main fundamental approaches to quantum mechanics, only theories
modelled on de Broglie and Bohm’s original pilot-wave theory provide fully deterministic
underpinnings for it. (For a handy reference to philosophical issues in quantum mechanics,
see Myrvold (2018b) and references therein. For more on Nelson see footnote 40.)
516 December is the traditional date for Beethoven’s birthday, but we know from doc-
umentary evidence only that he was baptised on 17 December 1770 – Beethoven was
probably born on 16 December.
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thought to be objective (‘Will this atom decay within the next minute?’).
And, indeed, while there is an entrenched terminology for probabilities that
are not purely subjective (namely ‘objective probabilities’), non-epistemic
probabilities do not even seem to have a separate standard name (we shall call
them ‘ontic probabilities’). It is indeed tempting to think that all epistemic
probabilties are subjective and all ontic probabilities are objective.
I urge the reader to resist this temptation. I believe that we can make good
use of the logical space that lies between these distinctions. As the Pop-
per and Jaynes quotations above are meant to suggest, objectivism about
probability will be self-limiting if it takes itself to apply only to ontic proba-
bilities, as will subjectivism about probability if it takes itself to apply only
to epistemic probabilities. The landscape of the philosophy of probability
will be both richer and more easily surveyable if we unscramble subjective
and epistemic probabilities in a way that allows also for (purely) subjective
ontic probabilities as well as for epistemic objective probabilities. While this
is surely not the first paper to make some of these claims (indeed, Jaynes is
obviously proposing that epistemic probabilities can be objective6), I believe
the way it approaches these questions will be original.
In what follows, I shall first recall the standard discussion of subjective and
objective probabilities given by David Lewis (Section 2), then try and spell
out what one typically means by the distinction between epistemic and ontic
probabilities (Section 3). This will provide enough background to argue that
there are bona fide cases of probabilities that are both purely subjective and
ontic (Section 4), and of probabilities that are both epistemic and objective
(Section 5). This will lead to an extension of Lewis’s definition of objective
probabilities and of his Principal Principle, in which chances become fun-
damentally conditional, thus redrawing the subjective-objective distinction
(Section 6), and to a more systematic discussion also of the epistemic-ontic
distinction, clarifying some further ambiguity (Section 7). I conclude the
paper with some additional remarks on time symmetry and on the quantum
state (Sections 8 and 9),7 and with more general remarks on how the pro-
6With the qualifications mentioned in footnote 2. Thanks to both Jos Uffink and
Ronnie Hermens for making me include more about Jaynes.
7These (especially the latter) can be skipped by readers who are not particularly famil-
iar with debates on the metaphysics of time or, respectively, on the nature of the quantum
state and of collapse in quantum mechanics.
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posed framework for conceptualising probabilities fits into an overall Humean
framework – at the same time distancing myself from some typical neo-
Humean views (Section 10).
2 Subjective vs objective probabilities
Recall the standard distinction between subjective and objective probabili-
ties: subjective probabilities are coherent degrees of belief, generally taken
to live in our head, while objective probabilities are meant to live out there
in the world, properties of external objects or reduced to such properties.
I shall follow (half of) the literature in taking subjective probabilities as
well-understood, and objective probabilities (if they exist) as being the more
mysterious concept. While the literature on subjective probabilities is con-
siderable and varied, I shall follow what is nowadays often considered the
standard analysis of how subjective and objective probabilities relate – and
which in fact provides an implicit definition of objective probabilities given
an understanding of subjective probabilities – David Lewis’s ‘A Subjectivist’s
Guide to Objective Chance’ (Lewis 1980).8
Importantly for our later discussion, Lewis takes objective probabilities (also
called ‘chances’) to be functions of propositions and times. Assuming for the
sake of example that there are chances for rolls of dice, before I roll a pair of
dice we have the intuition that the chance of rolling 11 is 1/18. Once I have
rolled the first die, the chance of 11 either goes down to 0 and stays there (if
I have rolled one of the numbers 1 to 4), or it goes up to 1/6 (if I have rolled
5 or 6). Then when I roll the second die the chance of 11 goes definitively
either down to 0 or up to 1.
The idea behind Lewis’s analysis is that objective probabilities, if they exist,
are the kind of thing that – in a sense to be made precise – would rationally
constrain our subjective probabilities (also called ‘credences’9) completely.
8While in a Cambridge HPS mood, I cannot refrain from thanking Jeremy Butterfield
for (among so many other things!) introducing me to this wonderful paper and all issues
around objective probabilities.
9Again, terminology varies somewhat, but I shall take ‘credences’ to be synonymous
with ‘subjective probabilities’.
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Credences of course are standardly taken to be rationally constrained both
synchronically by the probability calculus and diachronically by Bayesian
conditionalisation.10 Few other requirements are widely recognised as able
to constrain their values further (maybe only the requirement that credences
should be non-dogmatic, i. e. not take the values 0 or 1, is one commanding
near-universal support – but see the remarks below in Section 4). Thus, the
criterion that Lewis proposes for objective probabilities is very stringent.
What Lewis has in mind is the following. The chance at t of A is x iff there
is a proposition cht(A) = x such that (subject to a few provisos to be spelled
out) conditionalising on cht(A) = x will always yield the unique value x for
our credence,
crt
(
A
∣∣∣ cht(A) = x) = x , (1)
whatever the form of our credence function at the time t. Of course, if we
further believe at t that the chance at t of A is in fact x, i. e. if crt(cht(A) =
x) = 1, then our credence at t in A is also x (by the probability calculus), or
if we learn at t that cht(A) = x, our credence in A becomes x (by Bayesian
conditionalisation).
The stringency of Lewis’s requirements on what is to count as rationally
compelling is such that there are few candidates in the literature for satisfying
them, none of which are uncontroversial. And because Lewis himself believes
in ‘Humean supervenience’, for him chances have to supervene on ‘particular
matters of fact’, making it especially hard to find plausible explicit candidates
for objective chances. This problem is quaintly known in the literature as
the ‘big bad bug’.11
10Bayesian conditionalisation is often taken as the unique rational way in which one
can change one’s credences. But there may be other considerations competing with it, in
particular affecting background theoretical knowledge. This will generally be implicit (but
not needed) in much of this paper. Thanks to Jossi Berkovitz for pointing out to me that
de Finetti himself was not committed to conditionalisation as the only way for updating
probabilities, believing instead that agents may have reasons for otherwise changing their
minds (cf. Berkovitz 2012, p. 16).
11Two proposals of note are the one by Deutsch and by Wallace in the context of
Everettian quantum mechanics, who derive the quantum mechanical Born rule from what
they argue are rationality constraints on decision making in the context of Everett (see
e.g. Wallace (2010), or Brown and Ben Porath (this volume)), and the notion of ‘Humean
objective chances’ along the lines of the neo-Humean ‘best systems’ approach (Loewer
2004, Frigg and Hoefer 2010). Note that I am explicitly distinguishing between Lewisian
9
The provisos are, first, that our credence function at t should not rule out that
cht(A) = x, i. e. we should have crt(cht(A) = x) 6= 0, otherwise the credence
in (1) will be ill-defined; second, and more subtly, that our credence function
at t should not incorporate information that is ‘inadmissible’ at t. To make
this intuitive, think of the chance at t of A as fixing the objectively fair odds
for betting on A. Clearly, if in advance of making the bet either you or the
bookie had some more direct information about whether or not A will come
to pass (e. g. one of you is clairvoyant), that would be cheating. In order for
the notion of ‘objectively fair odds’ at time t to make sense, we need to have
an appropriate notion of what is admissible in shaping our credences at t. Not
everything can be admissible, for then we would allow A, or not-A, and the
only propositions about chance that could satisfy (1) would correspondingly
be propositions implying cht(A) = 1, or propositions implying cht(A) = 0,
and all chances would be trivial. On the other hand, some propositions
must be admissible, since cht(A) = x clearly is. We can write our credence
function crt(A) as cr(A|Et &T ), where cr(A) is a ‘reasonable initial credence
function’, T represents any background assumptions that we make (which
might perhaps better go in a subscript), and Et is our epistemic context at
time t (by which I mean all propositions about matters of fact known at time
t). If we leave fixed the background assumptions T , then crt(A) just evolves
by Bayesian conditionalisation upon the new facts that we learn between any
two times t and t′.12
chances as implicitly defined by the PP, and Humean objective chances. The latter are an
attempt to find something that will satisfy the definition of Lewisian chances, but there
is no consensus as to whether it is a successful attempt. (See Section 10 below for some
further comments on neo-Humeanism.) The Deutsch-Wallace approach is often claimed to
provide the only known example of Lewisian chances, but again this claim is controversial,
as it appears that some of the constraints that are used cannot be thought of as rationality
assumptions but merely as naturalness assumptions. On this issue see Brown and Ben
Porath (this volume) as well as the further discussion in Saunders et al. (2010). The
difficulty in finding anything that satisfies the definition of Lewisian chances is (of course)
an argument in favour of subjectivism.
12I shall assume throughout that degrees of belief attach to propositions about matters of
fact (in the actual world), which incidentally need not be restricted to Lewis’s ‘particular’
matters of fact (e.g. I shall count as matters of fact also holistic facts about quantum
states – if such facts there be). I shall call these material or empirical propositions.
Of course, some of the background assumptions that we make in choosing our degrees
of belief may not just refer to matters of fact, but will be theoretical propositions (say,
referring to possible worlds). In that case, I would prefer not to talk about degrees of
belief attaching to such theoretical propositions, but about degrees of acceptance.
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Substituting into (1), we have
cr
(
A
∣∣∣ (cht(A) = x) &Et &T) = x . (2)
And the requirement that (1) should hold whatever the form of our credence
function at t (subject to the provisos) now translates into the requirement
that (2) should hold for any ‘reasonable initial credence function’ (which we
shall keep fixed) and for any admissible propositions Et and T , which for
Lewis are, indeed, ones that are compatible with the chance of A being x
and in addition do not provide information about the occurrence of A over
and above what is provided by knowing the chance of A (if chance is to guide
credence, we must not allow information that trumps the chances). This is
The matter is further complicated by the fact that even full acceptance of a theory need
not imply belief in all propositions about matters of fact following from the theory. For
instance, an empiricist may believe only a subset of the propositions about actual matters
of fact following from a theory they accept (say, only propositions about observable events),
thus drawing the empirical-theoretical distinction differently and making a distinction
between material propositions and empirical propositions, which for the purposes of this
paper I shall ignore. (For my own very real empiricist leanings, see Bacciagaluppi (2019).)
For simplicity I shall also ignore the distinction between material propositions and actual
propositions that one makes in a many-worlds theory, where the material world consists of
several ‘possible’ branches, even though I shall occasionally refer to Everett for illustration
of some point.
One might reflect the distinction between material (or empirical) and theoretical propo-
sitions by not conditionalising on the latter, but letting them parameterise our credence
functions. Another way out of these complications may be to assign subjective probabili-
ties to all propositions alike, but interpret the probabilities differently depending on what
propositions they attach to: in general they will be degrees of acceptance, but in some
cases (all material propositions, or a more restricted class of empirical propositions), one
may think of them as straightforward degrees of belief. Such an additional layer of inter-
pretation of subjective probabilities will, however, not affect the role they play in guiding
our actions (degrees of acceptance will generally be degrees of ‘as-if-belief’). In any case,
the stroke notation makes clear that assuming a theory – even hypothetically – is meant
to affect our credences as if we were conditionalising on a proposition stating the theory
(I believe this is needed to derive some of Lewis’s results).
Note that for Lewis, T will typically include theoretical propositions about chances
themselves in the form of history-to-chance conditionals, and because in Lewis’s doctrine
of Humean supervenience chances in fact supervene on matters of fact in the actual world,
such background assumptions may well be propositions that degrees of belief can attach to
(at least depending on how one interprets the conditionals), even if one wishes to restrict
the latter (as I have just sketched) to propositions about matters of fact in the actual
world.
We shall return to the material-theoretical distinction in Section 7.
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Lewis’s ‘Principal Principle’ (PP) relating credence and chance. It can be
taken, is often taken, and I shall take it as providing the implicit definition of
objective probabilities: iff there is a proposition X such that, for all choices
of reasonable initial credence function and admissible propositions,
cr
(
A
∣∣∣X &Et &T) = x , (3)
then there is such a thing as the objective chance at t of A and its value is
x. The weakest such proposition X is then cht(A) = x.
13
More precisely, Lewis restricts admissible propositions about matters of fact
to historical propositions up to time t (at least ‘as a rule’: no clairvoyance,
time travel and such, and we shall follow suit for now – although he appears
to leave it open that one may rethink the analysis if one should wish to
consider such less-than-standard situations (Lewis 1980, p. 274)). Admissible
propositions about matters of fact can thus be taken to be what can be
reasonably thought to be knowable in principle at t, and Lewis allows them
to include the complete history Ht of the world up to that time. He also
allows hypothetical propositions about the theory of chance, i. e. about how
chances may depend on historical facts.
Even more propositions might be admissible at time t, but this partial charac-
terisation of admissibility already makes the PP a useful and precise enough
characterisation of objective chances. Indeed, taking the conjunction Ht &TC
of the complete history of the world up to t and a complete and correct the-
ory TC of how chances depend on history, the following will be an instance
of the PP:
cr
(
A
∣∣∣ (cht(A) = x) &Ht &TC) = x . (4)
Since TC is a complete and correct theory of chance, Ht &TC already implies
that cht(A) = x, and we can rewrite (4) as
cht(A) = cr(A|Ht &TC) . (5)
This instance of the PP is used by Lewis to derive various properties of
chances using known properties of credences, e. g. that they satisfy the prob-
ability calculus, and that they evolve by conditionalisation on intervening
13Note that X is a proposition about (actual) matters of fact. Thus, chances in the sense
of Lewis indeed satisfy the intuition that objective probabilities are properties of objects
or more generally determined by actual facts. Thanks to Jossi Berkovitz for discussion.
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events. In particular, according to Lewis, chances of past events are all 0 or
1. Taking ch(A) as the chance function at some arbitrary time t = 0, we can
thus for all later times write cht(A) = ch(A|Ht).
3 Epistemic vs ontic probabilties
A systematic treatment of the epistemic-ontic distinction comparable to
Lewis’s treatement of subjective and objective probabilities is not available.
But we can get a reasonably good idea of such a distinction, which will be
enough for the time being, by looking at common ways of using the term
‘epistemic probabilities’. (We shall revisit this distinction in Section 7.)
Epistemic probabilities are probabilities that attach to propositions of which
we are ignorant. An obvious example is: I flip a coin and do not look at
the result yet – what is the probability of Heads? In this situation, there is
a matter of fact about whether the coin has landed Heads or Tails, and if I
knew it, I would assign to Heads probability 0 or 1 (depending on what that
matter of fact was).
Another common example is modelling coin flipping as a deterministic New-
tonian process: even before the coin has landed, the details of the flip (initial
height, velocity in the vertical direction, and angular momentum14) deter-
mine what the outcome will be, but we generally do not know these details.
In this case, we say that the probabilities of Heads and Tails are epistemic,
even if the event of the coin landing Heads or Tails is in the future, because we
can understand such events as labels for sets of unknown initial conditions.
If we are looking for examples of ontic probabilities, we thus presumably
need to look at cases of indeterminism. The most plausible example is that
of quantum probabilities, say, the probability for a given atom to decay within
the next minute. (Of course, whether this is a genuine case of indeterminism
will depend on one’s views about quantum mechanics, in particular about
the existence of ‘hidden variables’. For the sake of the example we shall take
quantum mechanics to be genuinely indeterministic.)
14For the classic Newtonian analysis of coin flipping see Diaconis, Holmes and Mont-
gomery (2007).
13
Still, if all actual matters of fact past, present and future are taken to be
knowable in principle, then all probabilities become purely epistemic, and
(at least for now) it appears we cannot draw an interesting distinction.
One way of ensuring that the future is unknowable, of course, is to postulate
that the future is open, i. e. that at the present moment there is no (single)
future yet. This is a very thick metaphysical reading of indeterminism, how-
ever, which I wish to avoid for the purpose of drawing the epistemic-ontic
distinction.15 Indeterminism can be defined in a non-metaphysical way in
terms of the allowable models of a theory (or nomologically possible worlds,
if worlds are also understood in a metaphysically thin way): a theory is
(future-)deterministic iff any two models agreeing up to (or at) time t agree
also for all future times (and with suitable modifications for relativistic the-
ories).
For the purpose of this first pass at drawing the epistemic-ontic distinction
we can then simply stipulate that the notion of ignorance only pertains to
facts in the actual world that are knowable in principle, and that at time t
only facts up to t are knowable in principle (which is is in fact the stipulation
we already made in the context of Lewis’s analysis of chances – we may want
again to make a mental note to adapt the notion of ‘knowable in principle’ if
we allow for clairvoyance, time travel and such like). If one so wishes, one can
of course talk about ‘ignorance’ of which possible world is the actual world,
or of which way events in our world will be actualised. But if probabilities
in cases of indeterminism are to count as ‘ontic’, then it simply is the case
that in practice we make a more restrictive use of the term ‘ignorance’ when
we draw the epistemic-ontic distinction.
The general intuition is now that epistemic probabilities lie in the gap be-
tween probability assignments given what is knowable in principle (call it the
ontic context), and probability assignments given what is actually known (the
15Or for any other purpose – as a matter of fact, I shall assume throughout a block
universe picture. Specifically, in the case of indeterminism one should think of each possible
world as a block universe. The actual world may be more real than the merely possible
ones, or all possible worlds may be equally real (whether they are or not is inessential to
the following, although a number of remarks below may make it clear that I am no modal
realist, nor in fact believe in objective modality). But within each world, all events will be
equally real. (Note that at a fundamental level, the Everett theory is also deterministic
and Everettians emphasise that the Everettian multiverse is indeed a block universe.)
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epistemic context). By the same token, ontic probabilities are any probabil-
ities that remain non-trivial if we assume that we know everything that is
knowable in principle.
In general probabilities will be a mix of epistemic and ontic probabilities.
For instance, we ask for the probability that any atom in a given radioac-
tive probe may decay in the next minute, but the composition of the probe
is unknown: the probability of decay will be given by the ontic probabili-
ties corresponding to each possible radioactive component, weighted by the
epistemic probabilities corresponding to each component.
The EPR setup in quantum mechanics (within a standard collapse picture)
provides another good example: before Bob performs a spin measurement,
assuming the global state is the singlet state, Alice has ontic probability 0.5 of
getting spin up in any direction. After Bob performs his measurement, Alice
has ontic probabilities cos2(α/2) and sin2(α/2) of getting up or down, where
α is the angle between the directions measured on the two sides. However, she
is ignorant of Bob’s outcome, and her epistemic probabilities for his having
obtained up or down are both 0.5. Thus, given her epistemic context, her
(now mixed) probabilities for her own outcomes are unchanged.16
As a final example, assume we have some ontic probability that is also an
objective chance in the sense of Lewis. According to the PP in the form (5),
this ontic probability will be given by
cht(A) = cr(A|Ht &TC) . (6)
Now compare it with cr(A|Et &TC), our credence in A at t given the same
theoretical assumptions but our actual epistemic context Et. This now is a
mixed (partially epistemic) probability. Indeed, let H it be the various epis-
temic possibilities (compatible with our epistemic context Et) for the actual
history up to t (i. e. for the actual ontic context). We then have
cr(A|Et &TC) =
∑
i
cr(A|H it &Et &TC)cr(H it |Et &TC) , (7)
16This is of course the quantum mechanical no-signalling theorem, as seen in the stan-
dard collapse picture. (It is instructive to think through what the theorem means in
pilot-wave theory or in Everett. Thanks to Harvey Brown for enjoyable discussion of
this point.) And of course, mixed quantum states are the classic example of the distinc-
tion in quantum mechanics between probabilities that are ignorance-interpretable (‘proper
mixtures’) and probabilities that are not (‘improper mixtures’).
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which simplifies to
cr(A|Et &TC) =
∑
i
cr(A|H it &TC)cr(H it |Et &TC) , (8)
because the H it are fuller specifications of the past history at t than the
one provided by Et. In (8), now, the credences cr(H
i
t |Et &TC) are purely
epistemic probabilities, and the cr(A|H it &TC) are purely ontic probabilities
corresponding to each of the epistemically possible ontic contexts. The vari-
ous H it could e. g. fix the composition of the radioactive probe in our informal
example above.17
Judging by the examples so far, the subjective-objective distinction and the
epistemic-ontic distinction could well be co-extensive. Indeed, both sub-
jective and epistemic probabilities seem to have to do with us, while both
objective and ontic probabilities seem to have to do with the world. Epis-
temic probabilities depend on epistemic contexts, as do subjective ones; and
chances depend on past history, which we have also taken as the context in
which ontic probabilities are defined. But appearances may deceive.
In order to argue that the subjective-objective distinction and the epistemic-
ontic distinction are to be drawn truly independently, I need to convince you
that there are bona fide examples of probabilities that are both subjective (in
fact purely subjective) and ontic, and of probabilities that are both epistemic
and objective. These will be the respective objectives of the next two sections.
4 Subjective ontic probabilities
Let us start with the case of subjective ontic probabilities. I have discussed
this case before, in a paper (Bacciagaluppi 2014) in which I comment on
17In this example, it is of course possible to think of mixed epistemic and ontic prob-
abilities as arising not only through ignorance of matters of fact in the ontic context Ht,
but also through ignorance of the correct theory of chance TC . We might indeed know the
exact composition of the radioactive probe, but take ourselves to be ignorant of the correct
decay laws for the various isotopes, with different credences about which laws are correct.
I shall neglect this possibility in the following, because as noted already in footnote 12, I
prefer not to think of ignorance when talking about theoretical assumptions. In any case,
I shall not need this further possible case for the arguments below.
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Chris Fuchs and co-workers’ radical subjectivist approach to quantum me-
chanics, known as qBism (see e.g. Fuchs 2002, 2014),18 and in which I spell
out how I believe radical subjectivism a` la de Finetti (1970) can be applied
to quantum mechanics not only along qBist lines but also within any of the
traditional foundational approaches (Bohm, GRW and Everett). The idea
that subjectivism is applicable to quantum mechanics was in fact prompted
by Itamar, and worked out by Jossi Berkovitz in the years 1989–1991 with
specific reference to de Finetti’s idea that probabilities are only definable for
verifiable events.
For the purposes of the present paper, I need to make the case that purely
subjective probabilities can be ontic, thus radical subjectivism about quan-
tum probabilities (in a context in which quantum mechanics is taken to be
irreducibly indeterministic) provides the ideal example, and in the following
I shall rely heavily on my own previous discussion. (Alternatively, I could
arguably have relied on Berkovitz (2012).) Note that what I need to convince
you of is not that such a position is correct, but only that it is coherent, i. e.
that there is an interesting sense in which one can combine the notion of
purely subjective probabilities with that of ontic probabilities.
Itamar himself (2003, 2007), Bub (2007, 2010) and Fuchs and co-workers
have all defended approaches to quantum mechanics in which probabilities
are subjective in the sense of being degrees of belief, and some modifications
or additions to Bayesian rationality are introduced in order to deal with
situations, respectively, in which one deals with ‘quantum bets’ (incompatible
bets possibly with some outcomes in common), in which one assumes no-
cloning as a fundamental principle, or in which gathering evidence means
irreducibly intervening into the world. I take it that all of these authors (as
well as de Finetti himself) agree on the assumption that in general there
are no present or past facts that will determine the outcomes of quantum
bets or any quantum measurements, and thus that the probabilities in their
approaches are ontic in the sense used in the previous section.
It is less clear that the probabilities involved are purely subjective. Indeed,
both Pitowsky and Bub see subjective probability assignments as severely
constrained by the structure of quantum bets or quantum observables, in
18I am deeply grateful to Chris Fuchs for many lovely discussions about qBism and
subjectivism over a number of years.
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particular through Gleason’s theorem and (relatedly) through the mathe-
matical structure of collapse. These might be seen as rationality constraints,
so that the probabilities in these approaches might in fact be seen as at least
partly objective.19 As Itamar puts it (Pitowsky 2003, p. 408):
For a given single physical system, Gleason’s theorem dictates
that all agents share a common prior probability distribution or,
in the worst case, they start using the same probability distribu-
tion after a single (maximal) measurement.
Indeed, since pure quantum states always assign probability 1 to results of
some particular measurement, the constraints may be so strong that even
some dogmatic credences are forced upon us.
Fuchs instead clearly wishes to think of his probabilities as radically subjec-
tive (which I want to exploit). Precisely because of the strong constraints
imposed by collapse, he feels compelled to not only take probability assign-
ments as subjective, but also quantum states themselves and even Hamil-
tonians (Fuchs 2002, Sect. 7). To a certain extent, however, I think this is
throwing out the baby without getting rid of the bath water. Indeed, I believe
the (empirically motivated but normative) additions to Bayesian rationality
to which Fuchs is committed imply already by themselves very strong con-
straints on qBist probability assignments (Bacciagaluppi 2014, Sect. 2.2).
19Whether or not they are will make little difference to my argument (although if they
should be purely subjective I would have further concrete examples of subjective ontic
probabilities in the sense I need). In Bub’s case, he explicitly states that the no-cloning
principle is an assumption and could turn out to be false. That means that the constraints
hold only given some specific theoretical assumptions, and are not rationally compelling
in the strong sense used by Lewis. In Pitowsky’s case, the constraints seem stronger, in
the sense that the ‘quantum bets’ are not per se theoretical assumptions about the world,
but are just betting situations whose logical structure is non-classical. Whether or not
there are rational constraints on our probability assignments will be a well-posed question
only after you and the bookie have agreed on the logical structure of the bet. On the
other hand, whenever we want to evaluate credences in a particular situation, we need
to make a theoretical judgement as to what the logic of that situation is. That means,
I believe, that whether we can have rationally compelling reasons to set our credences
in any particular situation will still depend on theoretical assumptions, and fall short
of Lewis’s very stringent criterion. See Bacciagaluppi (2016) for further discussion of
identifying events in the context of quantum probability, and Sect. 1.2 of Pitowsky (2003)
for Itamar’s own view of this issue. Cf. also Brown and Ben Porath (this volume).
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On the other hand, as I shall presently explain, I also believe that radical
subjectivism can be maintained even within a context in which quantum
states and Hamiltonians are taken as (theoretical) elements in our ontology.
While in some ways less radical than Fuchs’s own qBism, this is the position
that I propose in my paper, and which I take to prove by example that a
coherent case can be made for (purely) subjective ontic probabilities. It can
be summarised as follows.
Subjectivism about probabilities (de Finetti 1970) holds that there are no
objective probabilities, only subjective ones. Subjective probability assign-
ments are strategies we use for navigating the world. Some of these strategies
may turn out to be more useful than others, but that makes them no less
subjective. As an example, take again (classical) coin flipping: we use sub-
jective probabilities to guide our betting behaviour, and these probabilities
get updated as we go along (i.e. based on past performance). But it is only a
contingent matter that we should be successful at all in predicting frequen-
cies of outcomes. Indeed, any given sequence of outcomes (with any given
frequency of Heads and Tails) will result from appropriate initial conditions.
Under certain assumptions the judgements of different agents will converge
with subjective probability 1 when conditionalised on sufficient common ev-
idence, thus establishing an intersubjective connection between degrees of
belief and frequencies. This is de Finetti’s theorem (see e.g. Fuchs 2002,
Sect. 9). One might be tempted to take it as a sign that subjective proba-
bilities are tracking something ‘out there’.20 This, however, does not follow
– because the assumption of ‘exchangeability’ under which the theorem can
be proved is itself a subjective feature of our probability assignments. The
only objective aspect relevant to the theorem is the common evidence, which
is again just past performance.
For the subjectivist, there is no sense in which our probability judgements
are right or wrong. Or as de Finetti (1970, Preface, quoted in Fuchs 2014)
famously expressed it: ‘PROBABILITIES DO NOT EXIST’. While this
sounds radical, it is indeed perfectly unremarkable as long as we assume
that states of affairs are always determinate and evolve deterministically. In
that case, Lewis himself will say that objective chances are all 0 or 1, so that
20Such a reading is e.g. perhaps present in Greaves and Myrvold (2010), or even in
Pitowsky (2003).
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all non-trivial probabilities are indeed subjective and (non-trivial) chances
do not exist.
What we need to consider is the case of indeterminism. Surely the situation is
completely different in quantum mechanics? As Lewis puts it in the introduc-
tion to the ‘Subjectivist’s Guide’, ‘the practice and analysis of science require
both [subjective and objective probabilities]’. He accordingly demands that
also subjectivists should be able to make sense of the proposition that ‘any
tritium atom that now exists has a certain chance of decaying within a year’
(Lewis 1980, p. 263). Thus, we are told, de Finetti’s eliminative strategy
towards chance cannot be applied to quantum mechanics.
But, actually, why not? In the deterministic case, de Finetti’s analysis shows
us how we can have a useful and even intersubjectively robust notion of
probability that relates to actual matters of fact but is conceptually quite
autonomous from them. And after all, it is especially when we take deter-
minism to fail and the world around us to behave randomly that we may
most need (probabilistic) strategies to navigate the world.
What goes unappreciated in the sweeping intuition that subjectivism must
fail in the case of indeterminism is precisely the role and status of the strate-
gies we apply in choosing our probability assignments. Subjectivists may well
use certain strategies or shortcuts to decide what subjective probability as-
signments to make. These are just what we called theoretical assumptions or
models in Section 2. They are not Lewisian rationality constraints on proba-
bility assumptions, but systematic ways in which we subjectively choose our
credences. Data may well ‘confirm’ such models, but again that just means
that our subjective probability assignments have performed well in the past.
The form theoretical models may typically take is that they will system-
atically connect certain non-probabilistic features of a given situation with
certain probability assignments. For instance, we may choose to assign cer-
tain subjective probabilities to rolls of dice given their internal weight dis-
tribution. For the subjectivist, these probabilities are and remain purely
subjective. Indeed, there is no necessary connection between the weight dis-
tribution in a die and the outcomes of our rolls, not just in the Humean sense
that these are independent matters of fact, but even in the sense that, given
a Newtonian model of dice rolling, for any possible sequence of results there
are initial conditions that will produce it. Thus, there is no Lewisian com-
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pelling rational justification for letting our credences depend on the weight
distribution in the die, only pragmatic criteria such as simplicity, again past
performance, etc.
From this perspective, quantum mechanics is just such a theoretical model
for choosing our subjective probabilities, and indeed a very successful one.
One can take the analogy with probabilistic models of dice rolling quite far:
unlike Fuchs, who identifies quantum states with catalogues of subjective
probabilities, I believe a subjectivist may take the quantum state itself as
a non-probabilistic, ontic feature of the world and use it (like weight distri-
bution) as the basis for choosing our subjective probabilities.21 There is no
need for a qBist like Fuchs to reject the putative onticity of quantum states,22
precisely because that by itself does not make our probability assignments
objective (forgive me, Itamar!).
As further described in Bacciagaluppi (2014), this general perspective can
be applied to all the main approaches to quantum mechanics that take the
quantum state as ontic, so that one can be a de Finettian subjectivist about
probabilities in the context of Bohm, GRW or Everett. In the case of Bohm,
this is unremarkable of course, because the Bohm theory is deterministic and
probabilities are epistemic in the sense used above. In the case of GRW, it is
an unfamiliar position. The default intuition in GRW is presumably to take
probabilities as some kind of propensities, but subjectivism may prove more
attractive.23 Finally, the Deutsch-Wallace decision-theoretic framework for
the Everett theory already analyses probabilities as subjective. Deutsch and
Wallace themselves (see e.g. Wallace 2010) argue that the weights in the
universal wavefunction in fact satisfy the Principal Principle (and are in fact
21The quantum state is thus taken to be a matter of fact, but presumably not a ‘partic-
ular matter of fact’ in the sense of Lewis, because of the holistic aspects of the quantum
state. (Cf. footnote 12 above.) Note also that historically the notion of quantum state
preceded its ‘statistical interpretation’, famously introduced by Max Born (for discussion
see Bacciagaluppi 2008).
22For other, even more forceful arguments to this conclusion, see Brown (forthcoming)
and Myrvold (this volume).
23Frigg and Hoefer (2007) have argued that the propensity concept is inadequate to the
setting of GRW. Their own preference is to use ‘Humean objective chances’ instead (cf.
Frigg and Hoefer 2010). Note that if the alternative subjectivist strategy includes taking
the quantum state as a non-probabilistic physical object, there are severe constraints
on doing this for the case of relativistic spontaneous collapse theories (see also below,
Sections 6 and 9).
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the only concrete example of something that qualifies as objective chances in
Lewis’s sense!). Many authors, however, dispute that the Deutsch-Wallace
theorem rationally compels one to adopt the Born rule. I concur, but see
that as no reason to reject the decision-theoretic framework itself. One can
simply use the Deutsch-Wallace theorem as an ingredient in our subjective
strategy for assigning probabilities on the basis of quantum states. I take
it that this is in fact the subjectivist (or ‘pragmatist’) position on Everett
proposed by Price (2010).
Thus, in all these cases (with the exception of Bohm of course), we have
a view in which the probabilities of quantum mechanics are coherently un-
derstood as both purely subjective and ontic, which is what we set out to
establish in this section.
5 Epistemic objective probabilities
We now need to discuss the case of epistemic objective probabilities. We
shall do so in the context of Lewis’s treatment of objective probabilities,
which however immediately raises an obstacle of principle. Recall that in
Section 3 we identified epistemic probabilities as situated in the gap between
what is knowable in principle and what is actually known, and that we settled
(at least provisionally) on taking what is knowable in principle at time t to
be the history of the world Ht up to that time. Now take our credence
at t in some proposition A (about some events at time later than t). As
mentioned, crt(A) = cr(A|Et &T ), where Et are the facts at times up to t
that we actually know at that time, and T are our theoretical assumptions.
As in the case of (8) above, crt(A) has thus the general form
cr(A|Et &T ) =
∑
i
cr(A|H it &T )cr(H it |Et &T ) . (9)
Here, unless the theoretical assumptions T describe the situation as deter-
ministic, the probabilities cr(A|H it &T ) will be non-trivial ontic probabilities.
(In fact, it is only now that this statement is unproblematic, after we have
argued in the last section that ontic probabilities can be equally subjective
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or objective.24) The epistemic component of our credence is given by the
various cr(H it |Et &T ). But if these probabilities are non-trivial, then ac-
cording to Lewis they cannot be objective (i.e. Lewisian chances). Indeed,
cr(H it |Et &T ) is just our credence crt(H it) at t in the proposition H it . But
that is a proposition about past history, and according to Lewis chances
of past events are always 0 or 1. Thus, non-trivial epistemic probabilities
cr(H it |Et &T ) cannot be objective.
We see that, given the PP, epistemic objective probabilities would seem to be
an oxymoron: if we are ignorant of certain matters of fact, and if propositions
about these facts are admissible in the sense of Lewis, then our non-trivial
credences about these facts are not objective, because chances of past events
are 0 or 1. It appears that Lewis is ruling out by definition that epistemic
probabilities could ever be objective. As seemed to be the case with Popper,
also for Lewis epistemic probabilities must be subjective.
For the sake of arguing that epistemic objective probabilities do make sense
after all, we shall of course grant the existence of objective probabilities in the
first place (pace de Finetti). Thus, assume that e.g. a quantum measurement
of electron spin displays objective probabilities, say 50-50 chances of ‘up’ or
‘down’. We shall take these as objective, in the Lewisian sense that if I ask
you to bet on the outcome of the next measurement, then conditionally on
the chances it is rationally compelling for you to bet at equal odds.
Now consider the case in which I perform such a measurement but do not
show you the outcome yet, and I ask you to bet. I make the following two
claims:
• Your (subjective) probabilities about the outcome are epistemic: there
is an outcome out there which is in principle knowable, and you employ
probabilities only because you do not in fact know it.
• You are still going to bet at equal odds, and in fact this is just as
rationally compelling as betting at those odds before the measurement.
The first claim is uncontroversial. The second one – your epistemic proba-
24Indeed, we defined such probabilities as ontic, so unless we accept subjective ontic
probabilities, we are committed to regarding these probabilities either as objective or
(more generally!) as objectively wrong.
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bilities after the measurement are rationally compelling, granted the proba-
bilities before the measurement are – I take to be incontrovertible. From a
Bayesian perspective, for instance, you have no new evidence. So it would
be irrational to change your subjective probabilities after I have performed
the experiment. But what is more, I shall now argue that your non-trivial
probabilities are objective for the same reason as in Lewis’s discussion. That
is, the rational justification for your probability assignment is still completely
in the spirit of the PP, even though it does not respect its letter.
Indeed, recall what the PP (3) says, as an implicit definition of objective
probabilities: iff there is a proposition X such that, for all choices of reason-
able initial credence function and admissible propositions,
cr
(
A
∣∣∣X &Et &T) = x , (10)
then A has an objective probability and its value is x. Crucially, Lewis sees
chances as functions of time. Thus he requires that our credence function
at t should not incorporate information that is inadmissible at the time t.
This corresponds to a betting situation in which you are allowed to know any
matters of fact up to time t, and the chances fix the objectively fair odds for
betting in this situation.
But in the case we are considering now, the betting situation is different. In-
deed, you are not allowed to know what has happened after I have performed
the measurement (even if the measurement was at a time t′ < t). If in this
betting situation you knew the outcome of the measurement, that now would
be cheating. In this situation, the proposition that the chance at t is equal
to x (in particular 0 or 1) is itself inadmissible information, and it is so for
the same reason that Lewis holds a proposition about the future chance of
an event to be inadmissible.
Indeed, in his version of the PP, Lewis is considering a betting context re-
stricted to what we can in principle know at t (i.e. the past history Ht), and
he asks for the best we can do in setting our rational credence in a future
event A. The answer is that the best we can do is to set our credence to
the chance of A at that time t. Information about how the chances evolve
after t is inadmissible because it illicitly imports knowledge exceeding what
we are allowed to know at t. If we consider restricting our betting context
further so that what we are allowed to know is what we could in principle
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have known at an earlier time t′, and now ask for the best we can do in
setting our rational credence in an event at t, then information about the
chance at t of that event has become inadmissible, again precisely because it
exceeds the assumed restriction on what we are allowed to know. The best
we can do is to set our credence to the chance of A at the earlier time t′.
The point is perhaps even clearer if we take Lewis’s reformulated version (5)
of the PP :
ch(A|Ht) = cr(A|Ht &TC) . (11)
This tells us that if at t we include all admissible information, namely Ht and
TC , this information already implies what the chances are at t, so that the
best we can do in terms of setting our credence at t, is to take any reasonable
initial credence function and conditionalise on Ht and TC .
But now if we assume that our epistemic context Et is restricted toHt′ , clearly
the best we can do is to take the information Ht′ we actually have and feed it
into the complete theory of chance TC , yielding as credence cr(A|Et &TC) =
ch(A|Ht′). This credence will now be rationally compelling, even if it is not
equal to ch(A|Ht).
The intuition is that in order to judge whether a subjective probability con-
ditional on the epistemic context Et = Ht′ is in fact objective, we need to
compare it not to the objective probability conditional on the history Ht
at the time of evaluation of our credence, but to the objective probability
conditional on the history Ht′ that matches our epistemic context. And this
now indeed provides the room for non-trivial objective probabilities even for
events that could in principle be known.
6 Redrawing the subjective-objective distinc-
tion
We have argued above that one can make good sense both of subjective (in-
deed, purely subjective) ontic probabilities and of epistemic objective proba-
bilities, thus arguing in favour of two unusual conceptual possibilities. But in
other respects we had to be quite conservative. Indeed, the arguments above
would have been weakened had we not tried to keep as much as possible to
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the accepted use of the terms ‘epistemic’, ‘ontic’, ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’.
Once we have seen the usefulness of admitting subjective ontic probabili-
ties and epistemic objective probabilities, however, we might be interested in
trying to redraw the subjective-objective distinction and the epistemic-ontic
distinction in ways that are both more systematic and cleaner in the light of
our new insights.
Let us start with the subjective-objective distinction. What we have just
argued for in Section 5 is that there are more cases of rationally compelling
credences than Lewis in fact allows for.25
Lewis’s intuition is that chances are functions of time, and in the formula-
tion of the PP this effectively forces him to privilege the maximal epistemic
context Ht comprising all that is knowable in principle at t, or equivalently
to quantify over all epistemic contexts Et comprising what may be actually
known at t. Thus, according to Lewis, we need to ask whether propositions
exist that would fix our credences across all epistemic contexts admissible at
time t.
But we have just argued that we can also ask whether propositions exist that
would fix our credences when we are in a particular one of these epistemic
contexts. Specifically, we considered the situation in which at t we only know
all matters of fact up to t′ < t. In that case, if we assume Lewisian chances
exist, we know in fact that there are such propositions, namely the chances
at t′.
Now we can ask that same question in general : do propositions exist that
would fix our credences when we are in an arbitrary epistemic context E
(e. g. any ever so partial specification of the history up to a time t)? If so, we
shall talk of the chances not at the time t, but the chances given the context
E. Lewisian chances at t are then just the special case when E has the form
Ht.
Writing it down in formulas, we have a natural generalisation of the PP and
of objective probabilities: given a context E, iff there is a proposition X such
that, for all choices of reasonable initial credence function and any further
25Many thanks to Ronnie Hermens for noting that this point was not spelled out clearly
enough in a previous draft.
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theoretical assumptions T (compatible with X),
cr
(
A
∣∣∣X &E&T) = x , (12)
then A has an objective probability given the context E and its value is x.
The weakest such proposition will be denoted chE(A) = x.
Now, similarly as with Lewis’s own reformulation (5) of the PP, note that
a complete theory of chance will now include also history-to-chance condi-
tionals for any antecedent E for which chances given E exist. Therefore, not
only will the following be an instance of the generalised PP (12),
cr
(
A
∣∣∣ (chE(A) = x) &E&TC) = x , (13)
but we can further rewrite it as
chE(A) = cr(A|E&TC) . (14)
Thus, also our generalised chances will have the kind of properties that Lewis
derives for his own chances from his reformulation (5) of the original PP (in
particular, they will obey the probability calculus).
Further, (14) makes vivid the intuition that if we have a complete and correct
theory of (generalised) chance, the best we can rationally do if we are in the
epistemic context E, is just to plug the information we actually have into the
complete and correct theory of chance, and let that guide our expectations.
Finally, and very significantly, we see from (14) that chances in the more
general sense are not functions of propositions and times, but functions of
pairs of propositions, and they have the form of conditional probabilities.
That is, in this picture chances are fundamentally conditional. I believe this
has many advantages.26
26Note that also epistemic and ontic probabilities as discussed here are naturally seen as
conditional (on epistemic and ontic contexts, respectively). That all probabilities should be
fundamentally conditional has been championed by a number of authors (see e.g. Ha´jek
(2011) and references therein). The idea in fact fits nicely with Lewis’s own emphasis
that already the notion of possibility is in fact to be naturally understood as a notion
of compossibility, of what is possible keeping fixed a certain context. (Recall his lovely
example in Lewis (1976) of whether he can speak Finnish as opposed to an ape, or cannot
as opposed to a native speaker.)
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From the point of view of the philosophy of physics, such a liberalisation of
the PP means that all kinds of other probabilities used in physics can now
be included in what could potentially be objective chances.
For instance, it allows one to consider the possibility of high-level probabilities
being objective. By high-level probabilities I mean probabilites featuring in
theories such as Boltzmannian statistical mechanics, which is a theory about
macrostates, identified as coarse-grained descriptions of physical systems.
Our generalised PP allows one among other things to apply a Lewisian-
style analysis to probabilities conditional on such a macrostate of a physical
system, thus introducing the possibility of objective chances even in case we
are ignorant of the microstate of a system such as a gas (pace Popper).27
Or take again the EPR setup: Bob performs a measurement, usually taken
to collapse the state also of Alice’s photon, so that the probabilities for her
own measurement results are now cos2(α/2) and sin2(α/2). Let us grant
that these probabilities are objective. In Section 3 we considered Alice’s
probability assignments in the epistemic context in which she does not know
yet the result of the measurement on Bob’s side, and treated them as partially
epistemic. Now, however, we can argue that in Alice’s epistemic context what
is rationally compelling for her is to keep her probabilities unchanged, because
we compare them with the quantum probabilities conditional on events only
on her side.
Indeed, the situation is very much analogous to the simple example in which
I perform a measurement but do not tell you the result. If anything, in the
EPR example the case is even more compelling, because there is no way
even in principle that Alice could know Bob’s result if the two measurements
are performed at spacelike separation. Thus, if we take probabilities to be
encoded or determined by the quantum state, we have now made space for
the idea that collapse does not act instantaneously at a distance, but along
the future light cone (of Bob’s measurement in this case).
27And pace Lewis, who explicitly ruled out the possibility of such deterministic chances
(1986, p. 118). Note that high-level deterministic chances relate to all kinds of interest-
ing questions (e.g. emergence, the trade-off between predictive accuracy and explanatory
power, the demarcation between laws and initial conditions, etc.). For recent literature
on the debate about deterministic chances, see e.g. Glynn (2009), Lyon (2011), Emery
(2013), and references therein.
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Quite generally, it is clear that Lewis’s treatment of chances taken literally is
incompatible with relativity, for Lewis’s chances as functions of time presup-
pose a notion of absolute simultaneity. Indeed, the idea that chance could
be relativised to space-like hypersurfaces or more generally to circumstances
which are independent of absolute time, e.g. properties of space-time regions,
was proposed in Berkovitz (1998), who discusses this proposal with respect
to causality and non-locality in the quantum realm.
A relativistic generalisation of Lewisian chances will automatically require
more liberal contexts E – as we have proposed here – because there is no
longer an absolute notion of simultaneity, or of ‘past’, or of ‘becoming’, deter-
mining which events we need to conditionalise upon to temporally evolve our
chances. As is well known, in special relativity these notions can be modified
in two ways: one either takes simultaneity to be relative to inertial frames or
more generally to spacelike foliations, or one localises the notion of absolute
past to the past light cone of a spacetime event (or spacelike segment or
bounded spacetime region). Both indeed require generalising chances from
just defining them relative to ‘past histories’ Ht to contexts that are the past
of arbitrary spacelike hyperplanes or hypersurfaces, or, respectively, to con-
texts that are the past light cones of arbitrary events (or spacelike segments
or bounded regions).
Conditionalising on the past of arbitrary hypersurfaces is what Myrvold
(2000) has proposed as a way of conceptualising relativistic collapse in the
case of quantum mechanical probabilities.28 Conditionalising on past light
cones instead is what Ismael (2011) has proposed as a way of conceptualising
chances in the case of relativity. Applied to quantum mechanics, this corre-
sponds to the EPR example as we have just revisited it, with a conception
of collapse along the future light cone.29
For yet another example, in recent work Adlam (2018a,b) has argued that
28I actually prefer the 2000 archived version to the published paper (Myrvold 2002).
More recently, Myrvold (2017a) has shown that any such theories of foliation-dependent
collapse must lead to infinite energy production. I believe, however, that Myrvold’s idea
that probabilities in special relativity (and in quantum field theory) can be defined con-
ditional on events to the past of an arbitrary hypersurface can still be implemented (see
Section 9 below).
29I am indebted to both of these proposals and their authors in more ways than I can
say. See also my Bacciagaluppi (2010a).
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‘temporal locality’ and ‘objective chances’ risk becoming two mutually sup-
porting dogmas of modern physics. Maybe slightly oversimplifying, the point
is that the idea of objective chances defined at a time t and that of a physical
state at time t being all that is needed to predict the physical state at times
t + ε in fact seem to naturally relate to and support each other. Adlam ar-
gues that this creates an obstacle to the development of e. g. non-Markovian,
retrocausal, and ‘all-at-once’ theories.30 But in fact, it is only the standard
Lewisian form of objective chances at time t that may be inimical to such de-
velopments, and the present generalisation of the PP removes this particular
obstacle.
For instance, suppose we have some physical theory involving non-Markovian
probabilities. The Lewisian definition of chances actually does allow for non-
Markovian chances, in the sense that cht(A) = ch(A|Ht) now in general
is a proposition that depends on the whole of the history Ht. However,
if at t we only have information about some previous times t1, . . . , tn, the
original PP has nothing to recommend us except to try and figure out the
missing information, so as to be able to determine the chances ch(A|Ht) at
t. Our physical theory, instead, does contain also probabilities of the form
p(A|Et1& . . .&Etn), where Eti describes the state of our physical system at
time ti. In order to be able to say that also these probabilities featuring in
our non-Markovian theory are objective, we have to generalise chances to
allow for contexts of the ‘gappy’ form E = Et1& . . .&Etn in (12)–(14).
Note that p(A|Et1& . . .&Etn) is just a coarse-graining of probabilities of the
form p(A|Hjt ), where Hjt is a possible history of the world up to t compatible
with Et1& . . .&Etn , i.e. a coarse-graining of probabilities which in turn do
allow a reading as Lewisian chances. In this sense, our generalisation (12)
appears to be required by sheer consistency, if we want objective probabilities
to be closed under coarse-grainings.31
30Retrocausal theories (in particular in the context of quantum mechanics) have been
vigorously championed by Price. All-at-once theories are ones in which probabilities for
events are specified given general boundary conditions, rather than just initial (or final)
conditions, and have been championed in particular by Wharton. See e.g. Price (1997),
Wharton (2014) and the other references in Adlam (2018a). For further discussion see
also Rijken (2018) (whom I thank for discussion of Adlam’s work).
31Of course also in the case of E = Ht′ , the chance given E is the coarse-graining over
all possible intervening histories between t′ and t. But this particular coarse-graining does
yield again a Lewisian chance, namely the chance at t′.
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Finally, even leaving aside motivations from philosophy of physics, what may
perhaps be decisive from the point of view of the philosopny of probability is
that such a generalisation of the PP completely eliminates the need to restrict
epistemic contexts to ‘admissible propositions’. The reason for worrying
about admissibility was that chances were tacitly or explicitly thought to
always refer to the context Ht, and the actual epistemic context had to be
restricted to admissible propositions in order not to bring in any information
not contained in Ht. By requiring that the (ontic) context of the chances
exactly match the (epistemic) context of the credences, no such possibility of
mismatch can arise, and no additional conditions of admissibility are needed.
I suspect Lewis himself might have welcomed such a simplification in the
formulation of the PP, especially given his own qualified formulations when
treating of admissible propositions in connection with the possibility of non-
standard epistemic contexts in the presence of time travel, clairvoyance, and
other unusual cases (as will in fact be the retrocausal and all-at-once theories
considered by Adlam).
7 Redrawing the epistemic-ontic distinction
Generalising chances to arbitrary contexts E in our discussion of subjective
and objective probabilities, suggests we might want to do something simi-
lar in our discussion of epistemic and ontic probabilities. While sufficient
for the purpose of our examples so far, taking epistemic probabilities to be
probabilities of past events (or any events determined by such events) is now
too restrictive. As we did in the case of chances, we should not only want
to be able to generalise to a relativistic setting, but also to be able to get
rid of the restriction to past events altogether, allowing in fact for all kinds
of non-standard epistemic contexts (clairvoyance, backwards-directed agents
with memories of the future, omniscience, and what not), and allowing con-
versely for taking an ontic perspective also on probabilities that are about
past events (e.g. in the case of coarse-graining).
This, however, also seems to raise a problem, namely that the distinction
between epistemic and ontic probabilities becomes a purely pragmatic one
at best. If we can extend or restrict at will which propositions we assume to
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be knowable in principle, then any probability can be alternatively seen as
epistemic or as ontic, and there is no substantive difference between the two.
To a large extent, we can bite the bullet, because the distinction between
epistemic and ontic probabilities clearly does have such a pragmatic aspect.
When in Section 5 we considered the example of the spin measurement with
unknown outcome, in the given epistemic context those probabilities are
of course epistemic. But if we are asked how we choose our probability
assignments in that situation, we will say that we are simply applying the
quantum probabilities that obtained at the time of the measurement, i. e. we
are mentally switching to a context in which the indeterministic outcomes are
still before us, and in which the probabilities predicted by quantum mechanics
(which there we assumed are objective) are thus ontic, so that our theoretical
assumptions about that ontic context can inform our probability assignments
in our current epistemic context.
In so doing, however, we also seem to be performing a second switch, one that
was in fact crucial to our arguing in Section 4 that ontic probabilities could
also be subjective (e.g. when adopting a subjectivist position about prob-
abilities of atomic decay). Indeed, while epistemic probabilities are about
unknown matters of fact in the actual world, ontic probabilities as we used
them in Section 4 are theoretical probabilities about alternative possibilities
in our models.32
We mentioned already in footnote 12 above a distinction between material
propositions (propositions about matters of fact in the actual world) and the-
oretical propositions (propositions within our theoretical models about the
world).33 We should thus distinguish accordingly between different dimen-
sions of possibility : material possibilities if we are wondering about what is
the case in the material world, and theoretical possibilities if we are wonder-
ing about what could be or might have been the case.
32And, indeed, already in Section 3 we suggested that ontic probabilities tend to be
associated with indeterministic contexts, which we defined in terms of multiple possible
futures in our theoretical models compatible with the present (or present and past) state
of the world.
33As mentioned above, one could of course distinguish further between the actual world
and the material world (if one is a many-world theorist) or take some material propositions
to be theoretical (if one is an empiricist), but for simplicity I neglect these possibilities.
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In this sense, epistemic probabilities are clearly probabilities about mate-
rial possibilities: this is the dimension of possibility in which beliefs live,
and epistemic probabilities are measures over unknown matters of fact in
the actual world (conditional on keeping the epistemic context fixed). But
now we recognise an ambiguity in the standard use of ‘ontic probabilities’
as construed so far: we have been sliding between on the one hand taking
also ontic probabilities to be material probabilities, namely measures over
unknowable facts in the actual world (conditional on keeping the ontic con-
text fixed, i.e. what is knowable in principle), and on the other hand taking
ontic probabilities to be theoretical probabilities, namely measures over al-
ternative possible worlds (now thinking of the fixed ontic context as what
we are conditioning on in the model). In the radioactive decay example this
means sliding between taking ontic probabilities as about what the actual
facts in the future are, and taking them as measures over alternative possible
worlds. Our examples of subjective ontic probabilities can be read in either
way, and remain subjective under either reading, whether we identify ontic
probabilities directly with the theoretical probabilities of our models (which
in Section 4 we took to be purely subjective), or whether we take the ontic
probabilities to be material, and use our subjective theoretical probabilities
in fixing them.
It is not essential to choose between the two readings of ontic probabilities, as
long as one can distinguish if required. Insofar as ontic probabilities feature
in our expectations, one might prefer to think of them as material probabili-
ties (since our expectations are about the actual world). On the other hand,
our probabilistic statements about, say, future quantum events will tend to
have modal force (in the sense of supporting causal and/or law-like state-
ments), indicating that more often than not we intend such probabilities to
be theoretical.34
In this context, while in some of my examples I use the terminology of pos-
sible worlds, or refer to ontic probabilities as law-like, the important thing is
indeed that our theoretical models and the probabilities that feature in them
34Material probabilities by definition support only indicative conditionals: ‘If Beethoven
was not born on 16th December, he was born on the 15th’ expresses our next best guess.
Instead, when talking about atomic decay we more commonly use subjunctive or counter-
factual conditionals, such as ‘Should this atom not decay in the next hour, it would have
probability 0.5 of decaying during the following hour’.
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have modal force, however understood. Our theoretical models may feature
probabilities in terms of probabilistic laws, or in terms of probabilistic causes;
if you object to possible worlds as a formalisation of modality (even though
I take them in a very thin sense) or to thinking of probabilities as law-like,
any alternative account of modal force will do.35
Another point to note is that, while we have said that insofar as epistemic
probabilities are material probabilities they do not have modal force, not all
theoretical probabilities need in fact have modal force. Some probabilities
in our models may be understood as contingent elements of a model. Such
is typically the case for initial distributions, or more generally single-time
distributions, even in theoretical models as, say, classical statistical mechan-
ics. And, indeed, when discussing Popper’s worries in Section 1 we claimed
as self-evident that the probability distributions in classical statistical me-
chanics are epistemic. But again we need to distinguish: as long as we are
talking of our credences about what is in fact the case inside a bottle, these
are indeed material and epistemic probabilities; as long, instead, as these are
theoretical probability distributions over different alternative theoretical pos-
sibilities in our model, they do not range over epistemic possibilities. Rather,
they appear to represent the contingent aspects of our theoretical model.36
Thus we see that there is a certain ambiguity between material and theo-
retical probabilities also when we are talking about epistemic probabilities.
Again, this ambiguity need not be worrying, as long as one is clearly aware
of the material-theoretical distinction.37
Indeed, to revisit one more time our standard example of mixed probabilities
(unknown composition of a radioactive probe, known decay laws for the
35My thanks to Niels van Miltenburg and to Albert Visser for pressing me on this point.
36We shall refine this point in our discussion of time-symmetric theoretical models in
Section 8.
37It may, however, contribute to muddle the waters in the Popper and Jaynes examples,
or indeed in modern discussions about ‘typicality’ in statistical mechanics: are we talking
about the actual world (of which there is only one), or about possible worlds (of which
there are many, at least in our models)? It is also not always clear which aspects of a
model are indeed law-like and which are contingent. We shall see a class of examples in
Section 8, but a much-discussed one would be whether or not the ‘Past Hypothesis’ can be
thought of as a law – which it is in the neo-Humean ‘best systems’ approach (cf. Loewer
2007); thanks to Sean Gryb for raising this issue. For further discussion of typicality
and/or the past hypothesis, see e.g. Goldstein (2001), Frigg and Werndl (2009), Wallace
(2011), Pitowsky (2012), and Lazarovici and Reichert (2015).
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various isotopes), we can now give multiple readings of these probabilities.
We can see them as expressing our expectations about a material proposition
in our future, which we evaluate by mixing our epistemic probabilities for the
composition of the probe and our ontic probabilities (in the material sense)
about what will happen in the various cases. In this case, we fix the values
of the latter probabilities using the law-like probabilities of our theoretical
models. Or we see them throughout as probabilities in a theoretical model,
but with a contingent distribution over the isotopes in the radioactive probe.
In that case, we can fix that distribution using our epistemic probabilities
for the composition of the probe. Or yet again, we can think of such mixed
probabilities as a sui generis mix of material and theoretical probabilities,
which we however commonly resort to in practice.
How to use theoretical models (i.e. which probabilities to use) will depend
pragmatically on our epistemic situation. Any given context can be seen as
the epistemic context of some putative agent wondering about the actual
world, or as an ontic context from which to judge the accessibility of other
possible worlds. But in any actual epistemic context in which we wonder
about what we do not know in the material world, we will happily and often
resort to theoretical models to guide our expectations.
8 Remarks on time symmetry
Many more things could be said about applying the newly-drawn distinctions
in practice. I shall limit myself in this section to a few remarks on the issue of
time symmetry, and in the next one to some further remarks on the quantum
state.
I mentioned in Section 3 that for the purpose of distinguishing epistemic
and ontic probabilities I did not want to commit myself to a metaphysically
thick notion of indeterminism, with a ‘fixed’ past and an ‘open’ future. Now
we can see that such a notion is in fact incompatible with the way I have
suggested drawing the epistemic-ontic distinction.
Indeed, as drawn in Section 7, the epistemic-ontic distinction allows for ontic
probabilities also in the case we theoretically assume backwards indetermin-
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ism (where models that coincide at a time t or for times s ≥ t need not
coincide at times earlier than t). We can take the entire history to the future
of t as an ontic context (call it H˜t), and thus probabilities p(A|H˜t) about
events earlier than t as ontic. This is plainly incompatible with tying ontic
probabilities (whether in the material or the theoretical sense) to the idea of
a fixed past and open future.
There are other reasons for rejecting the idea of fixed past and open future.38
But the suggestion above seems to fly in the face of a number of arguments
for a different metaphysical status of past and future themselves based on
probabilistic considerations. It is these arguments I wish to address here,
specifically by briefly recalling and reframing what I have already written
in my Bacciagaluppi (2010b) against claims that past-to-future conditional
probabilities will have a different status (namely ontic) from that of future-
to-past conditional probabilities (allegedly epistemic). I refer to that paper
for details and further references.
Of course we are all familiar with the notion that probabilistic systems can
display strongly time-asymmetric behaviour. To fix the ideas, take atomic
decay, modelled simplistically as a two-level classical Markov process (we
shall discuss quantum mechanics proper in the next section), with an excited
state and a de-excited state, a (comparatively large) probability α for decay
from the excited state to the de-excited state in unit time, and a (compar-
atively small) probability ε for spontaneous re-excitation in unit time. We
shall take the process to be homogeneous, i.e. the transition probabilities to
be time-translation invariant.
Any initial probability distribution over the two states will converge in time
to an equilibrium distribution in which most of the atoms are de-excited (a
fraction α
α+ε
), and only a few are excited (a fraction ε
α+ε
), and the transition
rate from the excited to the de-excited state will asymptotically match the
38In particular, I agree with Saunders (2002) that standard moves to save ‘relativistic
becoming’ in fact undermine such metaphysically thick notions. Rather, I believe that
the correct way of understanding the ‘openness’ of the future, the ‘flow’ of time and
similar intuitions is via the logic of temporal perspectives as developed by Ismael (2017),
which straightforwardly generalises to relativistic contexts, since it exactly captures the
perspective of an IGUS (‘Information Gathering and Utilising System’) along a time-like
worldline. For introducing me to the pleasures of time symmetry I would like to thank in
particular Huw Price.
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transition rate from the de-excited to the excited state (so-called ‘detailed
balance’ condition).
This convergence to equilibrium is familiar time-directed behaviour. Of
course, given the joint distributions for two times s > t, transition prob-
abilities can be defined both from t to s and from s to t (by conditionalising
on the state at t and at s, respectively), but the example can be used in
a number of ways to argue that these transition probabilities forwards and
backwards in time must have a different status. In the language of this paper:
(A) Were backwards probabilities also ontic and equal to the forwards proba-
bilities, then the system would converge to equilibrium also towards the past,
and the system would have to be stationary (Sober 1993).
(B) While by assumption the forwards transition probabilities are time-
translation invariant, the backwards transition probabilities in general are
not, suggesting that they have a different status (Arntzenius 1995).
(C) If in addition to the forwards transition probabilities also the backwards
transition probabilities were law-like, the initial distribution would also in-
herit this law-like status, while it is clearly contingent – indeed can be freely
chosen (Watanabe 1965).
The problem with all these arguments is that they take the observed back-
wards frequencies as estimates for the putative ontic backwards probabilities.
But frequencies can be used as estimates for probabilities only when we have
reasons to think our samples are unbiased.39 For instance, we would never
used post-selected ensembles to estimate forwards transition probabilities.
However, we routinely use pre-selected ensembles, especially when we set up
experiments ourselves and in fact freely choose the initial conditions. Thus,
while we normally use such experiments to estimate forwards transition prob-
abilities, we plainly cannot rely on them to estimate the backwards ones.
It turns out that this time-asymmetric behaviour (and a large class of more
general examples) can indeed be modelled using stationary stochastic pro-
cesses in which the transition probabilities are time-symmetric, and in which
the time asymmetry is introduced by the choice of special initial (rather than
39That this is not always licensed is clear e.g. from discussion of causal loops (Berkovitz
1998, 2001).
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final) frequencies. Thus, in modelling such time-asymmetric behaviour there
is no need to use time-asymmetric ontic probabilities or to deny ontic status
altogether to the backwards transition probabilities of the process. The ap-
parent asymmetry comes in because we generally have asymmetric epistemic
access to a system: we tend to know aspects of its past history, and thus are
able to pre-select, while its future history will generally be unknowable.40
If one assumes that the transition probabilities are time-symmetric (or time-
symmetric except for some overall drift41), this places severe constraints on
the overall (multi-time) distributions that define the process. Not only is the
process stationary if it is homogeneous, but the process may well be uniquely
determined by its forwards and backwards transition probabilities.42 Thus,
in particular, the entire process inherits the ontic status of the transiton
probabilities.
This will seem puzzling, if we are used to thinking of transition probabilities
as ontic, and of initial distributions as epistemic, so that the probabilities of
the process should have a mixed character (as in the examples we discussed
beginning in Section 3). But as we saw in Section 7, we standardly align the
distinction between epistemic and ontic probabilities with the distinction be-
tween contingent and law-like aspects of our theoretical probabilistic models.
The theoretical probabilities of the process may very well be even uniquely
determined by the forwards and backwards transition probabilities, but our
40Of course, this strategy is analogous to that of modelling time-directed behaviour
in the deterministic case using time-symmetric laws and special initial conditions. The
same point was made independently and at the same time by Uffink (2007, Section 7),
specifically in the context of probabilistic modelling of classical statistical mechanics. A
further explicit example of time-symmetric ontic probabilities is provided by Nelson’s
(1966, 1985) stochastic mechanics, where the quantum mechanical wavefunction and the
Schro¨dinger equation are derived from an underlying time-symmetric diffusion process. See
also Bacciagaluppi (2005) and references therein. The notorious gap in Nelson’s derivation
pointed out by Wallstrom (1989) has now been convincingly filled through the modification
of the theory recently proposed by Derakhshani (2017).
41In the case of Nelson’s mechanics, for instance, one has a systematic drift velocity that
equals the familiar de Broglie-Bohm velocity (which in fact also changes sign under time
reversal). If one subtracts the systematic component, transition probabilities are then
exactly time-symmetric.
42More precisely, it will be uniquely determined within each ‘ergodic class’. (Note that
ergodicity results are far easier to prove for stochastic processes than for deterministic
dynamical systems. See again the references in Bacciagaluppi (2010b) for details.)
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theoretical models will still provide scope for contingent elements through the
notion of samples of the process. We then feed our epistemic probabilities
into the theoretical model via constraints on the frequencies in the samples,
which will typically be initial constraints because of our time-asymmetric
access to the empirical world.43
9 Further remarks on the quantum state
We have just seen that, classically, a stochastic process may be nothing over
and above an encoding of its forwards and backwards transition probabilities.
I now wish to briefly hint at the possibility that the same may be true also
in quantum mechanics.44
In quantum mechanics, the role of determining transition probabilities be-
longs to the quantum state (either the fixed Heisenberg-picture state, or
the totality of the time-evolving Schro¨dinger-picture or interaction-picture
states45). The quantum state, however, is traditionally seen as more than
simply encoding transition probabilities, rather as a physical object in itself,
which in particular determines these probabilities. One obvious exception is
qBism, where however I have argued in Section 4 above that the rejection of
the quantum state as a physical object is not sufficently motivated.46
43Without going into details, these distinctions will be relevant to debates about the
‘neo-Boltzmannian’ notion of typicality (see the references in footnote 37), and about
the notion of ‘sub-quantum disequilibrium’ in theories like pilot-wave theory or Nelsonian
mechanics (for the former see e.g. Valentini 1996, for the latter see Bacciagaluppi 2012).
44This section can be skipped without affecting the rest of the paper. The discussion is
substantially influenced by Myrvold (2000), but should be taken as an elaboration rather
than exposition of his views. See also Bacciagaluppi (2010a). For Myrvold’s own recent
views on the subject, see Myrvold (2017b, 2019).
45The interaction picture is obtained from the Schro¨dinger picture by absorbing the free
evolution into the operators. In other words, one encodes the free terms in the evolution
in the evolution of the operators, and encodes the interaction in the evolution of the state.
46Another obvious exception is Nelson’s stochastic mechanics (mentioned in foot-
note 40), but there it is not the quantum mechanical transition probabilities that are
fundamental but the transition probabilities of the underlying diffusion process. While
also a number of Bohmians (cf. Goldstein and Zangh`ı 2013) think of the wavefunction
not as a material entity but as nomological, as a codification of the law-like motion of
the particles, there is no mathematical derivation in pilot-wave theory of the wavefunction
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In this section I want to take a look at a different approach to quantum
theory, where I believe there are strong constraints to taking the quantum
state as an independently existing object, and reasons to take it indeed as
just encoding (ontic, law-like) transition probabilities, largely independently
of the issue of whether these probabilities should be subjective or objective.47
This approach is the foliation-dependent approach to relativistic collapse.
As is well-known, non-relativistic formulations of collapse will postulate that
the quantum state collapses instantaneously at a distance (whether the col-
lapse is spontaneous or the traditional collapse upon measurement). So,
for instance, in an EPR scenario the collapse will depend on whether Al-
ice’s or Bob’s measurement takes place first. However, predictions for the
outcomes of the measurements are independent of their order because the
measurements commute: we obtain the same probabilities for the same pairs
of measurement results. This suggests that one might be able to obtain a
relativistically invariant formulation of collapse after all. One of the main
strategies for attempting this takes quantum states to be defined relative
to spacelike hyperplanes or more generally relative to arbitrary spacelike
hypersurfaces, and collapse accordingly to be defined relative to spacelike
foliations. This option has been pioneered for a long time by Fleming (see
e.g. 1986, 1989, 1996), and analysed conceptually in great detail by Myrvold
(2000) (see also Bacciagaluppi (2010a)).48
A convenient formal framework for foliation-dependent collapse is provided
by the Tomonaga-Schwinger formalism of quantum field theory, in which
the (interaction-picture) quantum state is explicitly hypersurface-dependent,
and unitary evolution in the presence of interactions is represented as a local
evolution of the quantum state from one hypersurface to the next (and is
independent of the choice of foliation between two hypersurfaces S and S ′). A
non-unitary collapse evolution can be included in the same way, as proposed
and Schro¨dinger equation from more fundamental entities comparable to that in stochas-
tic mechanics. The wavefunction can be thought of as derivative only if one takes a quite
radical relationist view, like the one proposed by Esfeld (2017).
47For a sketch of how I think this relates to the PBR theorem (Pusey, Barrett and
Rudolph 2012), see below.
48The other main strategy is to consider collapse to be occurring along light cones (either
along the future light cone or along the past light cone, as in the proposal by Hellwig and
Kraus (1970), and it arguably allows one to retain the picture of quantum states as physical
objects (Bacciagaluppi 2010a). No such theory has been developed in detail, however.
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explicitly e.g. by Nicrosini and Rimini (2003), provided one can ensure that
the evolution is also indepedent of the foliation chosen.
The substantial difference between the unitary and non-unitary case is that
in the unitary case, the local state on a segment of a spacelike hypersurface
(say, the reduced state of Alice’s electron) is independent of whether the
segment, say, T ∩T ′ is considered to be a segment of a hypersurface T or of a
different hypersurface T ′. In the non-unitary case, in general the restriction
ψT |T∩T ′ on T ∩T ′ of a state ψT on T is different from the restriction ψT ′|T∩T ′
on T ∩ T ′ of the state ψT ′ on T ′. Indeed, in the EPR case ψT could be
the singlet state, so that ψT |T∩T ′ is maximally mixed, while T ′ could be to
the future of Bob’s measurement, so that ψT ′|T∩T ′ is, say, the state |+y〉. In
particular, whether Alice’s electron is entangled with Bob’s will depend on
the hypersurface one considers (or the frame of reference – Myrvold (2000)
aptly calls this the ‘relativity of entanglement’).
This now raises issues of how to interpret such a collapse theory, specifically
in a way that could give rise to the manifest image of localised objects in space
and time. The standard options for doing so go under the names of ‘wave-
function ontology’, ‘mass-density ontology’, and ‘flash ontology’, depending
on whether one takes the physical objects of the theory to be the quantum
states, local mass densities defined via the states, or the collapse events them-
selves. Hypersurface-dependence of quantum states appears to rule out the
wavefunction ontology, precisely because if quantum states are hypersruface-
dependent, they do not have unique local restrictions, so an ontology based
on them fails to underpin any local reality. Similarly, mass-density ontology
is ruled out, because hypersurface-dependent states do not define uniquely
any local mass densities. The only option that could give rise to a localised
manifest image of reality appears to be the flash ontology. This means that
hypersurface-dependent states indeed merely encode probabilities for physi-
cal events to the future of a spacelike hypersurface, conditional on physical
events to the past of that hypersurface. If so, as Myrvold (2000, footnote 7)
remarks, it is unsatisfactory that we should not yet have a formulation of the
theory directly in terms of transition probabilities, but require an additional
theoretical object, the quantum state, to determine these probabilities. (As
we saw in Section 6, also Adlam (2018a,b) is critical of thinking of a separate
physical object as determining the quantum probabilities.)
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What I wish to suggest is that, as in the classical case of Section 8, the
use of a separate quantum state to calculate transition probabilities may be
an artefact of our own limited epistemic perspective, and that one needs no
more than forwards and backwards transition probabilities corresponding to
a ‘stationary process’. The form of this process is easy to guess, reason-
ing by time symmetry from the fact that the future boundary condition we
standardly use is the maximally mixed state. If we take that to be the case
because we happen to lack information about the future, and therefore do
not post-select, that suggests that if we want to remove the pre-selection
that we normally do, and thus get to the correct theoretical probabilities, we
need to take the maximally mixed state also as the past boundary condition.
The appearance of a contingent quantum state would then follow from the
fact that we have epistemic access to past collapses, and conditionalise upon
them when making predictions, in general mixing our epistemic probabilities
about such past collapses (‘results of measurements’) and ontic transition
probabilities provided by the theory.
Of course in general the maximally mixed state is unnormalisable, but condi-
tional probabilities will be well-defined. In such a ‘no-state’ quantum theory
not only are conditional probabilities fundamental, but unconditional prob-
abilities in general do not even exist.49
No-state foliation-dependent flash-ontology quantum field theory would thus
be a way of directly implementing Myrvold’s idea that conditional proba-
bilities should be determined by the theory directly, and not by way of the
quantum state. Better predictions will be obtained the more events one con-
ditionalises upon stretching back into the past. The theory is thus essentially
49Rather related ideas are common in the decoherent histories or consistent histories
literature. Griffiths (1984) does not use an initial and a final state, but an initial and a
final projection of the same kind as the other projections in a history, so his consistent
histories formalism is in fact a no-state quantum theory. Hartle (1998) suggests that
the fundamental formula for the decoherence functional is the two-state one, but that we
are well-shielded from the future boundary condition so that two-state quantum theory
is predictively equivalent to standard one-state quantum theory (i.e. we can assume the
maximally mixed state as future boundary condition). If in one-state quantum theory
we assume that we are similarly shielded from the initial boundary condition, then by
analogy one-state quantum theory is in fact predictively equivalent to no-state quantum
theory (i.e. we can assume the maximally mixed state also as past boundary condition).
Thus, it could just as well be that no-state quantum theory is fundamental. (Of course
we need to include pre-selection on the known preparation history.)
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non-Markovian (thus temporally non-local, in line with Adlam’s views). As
mentioned in footnote 28, Myrvold (2017a), developing remarks by Pearle
(1993), has shown that foliation-dependent collapse theories always run into
a problem of infinite energy production, but I believe a no-state theory in
fact escapes this conclusion.50
Such a proposal has in fact been put forward in the non-relativistic case by
Bedingham and Maroney (2017), in a paper in which they discuss in general
the possibility of time-symmetric collapse theories. As with the requirement
of Lorentz invariance, the requirement of time symmetry makes it problem-
atic to think of the collapsing quantum state as a physical object, because the
sequence of collapsing states defined by the collapse equations applied in the
past-to-future direction is not the time reversal of the sequence of states de-
fined by the collapse equations applied in the future-to-past direction. That
is, the quantum state is time-direction-dependent. However, under very mild
conditions, from the application of the equations in the two directions of
time one does obtain the same probabilities for the same collapse events.
This suggests, again as in the relativistic case, that a time-symmetric theory
of collapse requires a flash ontology. And, as I am suggesting in the case of
hypersurface-dependence, Bedingham and Maroney suggest one might want
to get rid altogether of the quantum state (since the collapse mechanism
suggests it is asymptotically maximally mixed).51
50The idea behind Myrvold’s proof is extremely simple. Leaving technicalities aside,
because of the Lorentz-invariance of the vacuum state, infinite energy production would
arise if localised collapse operators did not leave the vacuum invariant on average. Thus,
one should require that local collapse operators leave the vacuum invariant. But since a
local operator commutes with local operators at spacelike separation, and since (by the
Reeh-Schlieder theorem) applications of the latter can approximate any global state, it
follows that in order to avoid infinite energy production collapse operators must leave
every state invariant. Thus there is no collapse.
One way out that is already present in the literature (and which motivates Myrvold’s
theorem) is to tie the collapse to some ‘non-standard’ fields (which commute with them-
selves at spacelike and timelike separation), as done by both Bedingham (2011) and Pearle
(2015) himself. Another possibility, favoured by Myrvold (2018a), is to interpret the re-
sult as supporting the idea that collapse is tied to gravity: in the curvature-free case of
Minkowski spacetime, the theorem shows there is no collapse. As mentioned, however, I
believe that a no-state proposal will also circumvent the problem of infinite energy pro-
duction, because collapse operators will automatically leave the (also Lorentz-invariant)
maximally mixed state invariant on average.
51I should briefly remark on how I think these suggestions relate to the the work of
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One can find an analogy for the approach discussed in this section by look-
ing at Heisenberg’s views on ‘quantum mechanics’ (i.e. matrix mechanics) as
expressed in the 1920s in opposition to Schro¨dinger’s views on wave mechan-
ics.52 The evidence suggests that Heisenberg did not believe in the existence
of the quantum state as a physical object, or of collapse as a physical pro-
cess. Rather, the original physical picture behind matrix mechanics was
one in which quantum systems performed quantum jumps between station-
ary states. This then evolved into a picture of quantum systems perform-
ing stochastic transitions between values of measured quantities. Transition
probabilities for Heisenberg were ‘out there’ in the world (i.e. presumably
objective as well as ontic). If a quantity had been measured, then it would
perform transitions according to the quantum probabilities. The observed
statistics would conform to the usual rules of the probability calculus, in
particular the law of total probability. But if a quantity had not been mea-
sured, there would be nothing to perform the transitions, giving rise to the
phenomenon of ‘interference of probabilities’.
Schro¨dinger’s quantum states were for Heisenberg nothing but a convenient
tool for calculating (forwards) transition probabilities, and any state that led
to the correct probabilities could be used. (Note that, classically, forwards
transition probabilities are independent of the chosen initial conditions.)
Hence in particular, the movability of the ‘Heisenberg cut’ and Heisenberg’s
cavalier attitude to collapse,53 and the peculiar mix of ‘subjective’ and ‘ob-
Pusey, Barrett and Rudolph (2012), who famously draw an epistemic-ontic distinction for
the quantum state, and who conclude from their PBR theorem that the quantum state
is ontic. An ontic state for PBR is an independently existing object that determines the
ontic probabilities (in my sense) for results of measurements. And an epistemic reading of
the quantum state for PBR is a reading of it as an epistemic probability distribution (in
my sense) over the ontic states of a system. Thus, the PBR theorem seems to push for
a wavefunction ontology. In a no-state proposal (as here or in Bedingham and Maroney
(2017)), however, the probabilities for future (or past) collapse events are fully determined
by the set of past (or future) collapse events. The contingent quantum state (in fact
whether defined along hypersurfaces or along lightcones) can thus be identified with such
a set of events, which is indeed ontic, thus removing the apparent contradiction. Whether
this is the correct way of thinking about this issue of course deserves further scrutiny.
52For more detailed accounts, see Bacciagaluppi and Valentini (2009), Bacciagaluppi
(2008), Bacciagaluppi and Crull (2009), and Bacciagaluppi, Crull and Maroney (2017).
53For an example of (Born and) Heisenberg using a very unusual choice of ‘col-
lapsed states’ to calculate quantum probabilities, see Bacciagaluppi and Valentini (2009,
Sect. 6.1.2).
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jective’ elements in talking about quantum probabilities. And now, finally,
despite the shrouding in ‘Copenhagen mist’, we can perhaps start to make
sense of some of Heisenberg’s intuitions as expressed in ‘The Copenhagen
interpretation of quantum theory’ (Heisenberg 1958, Chap. 3).
10 Hume and de Finetti
This paper has suggested a framework for thinking of probabilities in a
way that distinguishes between subjective and epistemic probabilities. Two
strategies have been used: liberalising the contexts with respect to which one
can define various kinds of probabilities, and making a liberal use of proba-
bilities over theoretical possibilities. I wish to conclude by putting the latter
into a wider perspective and very briefly sketching the kind of subjectivist
and anti-metaphysical position that I wish to endorse.54
In forming theoretical models, whether they involve causal, probabilistic or
any other form of reasoning, we aim at describing the behaviour of our target
systems in a way that guides our expectations. To do so, our models need to
have modal force, to describe law-like rather than accidental behaviour. It
is up for grabs what this modal force is. We can have an anti-Humean view
of causes, laws or probabilities, as some kind of necessary connections, but
Hume (setting aside the finer scruples of Hume scholarship) famously denied
the existence of such necessary connections. This traditionally gives rise
to the problem of induction. Hume himself proposed a ‘sceptical solution’:
we are predisposed to come to consider certain connections between events
as causal through a process of habituation, which then forms the basis of
our very sophisticated reasonings about matters of fact (‘Elasticity, gravity,
cohesion of parts, communication of motion by impulse; these are probably
the ultimate causes and principles which we shall ever discover in nature;
and we may esteem ourselves sufficiently happy, if, by accurate enquiry and
reasoning, we can trace up the particular phenomena to, or near to, these
general principles’, Hume 1748, IV.I.26). There is no guarantee that our
54To this position, I would wish to add a measure of empiricism (Bacciagaluppi 2019).
For a similar view, see Brown and Ben Porath (this volume). On these matters (and
several others dealt with in this paper) I am earnestly indebted to many discussions with
Jenann Ismael over the years. Any confusions are entirely my own, however.
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expectations will come out true, but these forms of reasoning have served us
well.
There is no need, however, for Humeans to restrict themselves to thinking
of theoretical models in terms of Hume’s own analysis of causation. Any
theoretical models are indeed patterns we project onto the world of matters
of fact in order to reason about it. Modern-day pragmatists about causation
are essentially following Hume, even though they substitute manipulation for
habituation (Menzies and Price 1993). And the same is true of subjectivists
about probability. Subjective probabilities are patterns that we form in our
head, and impose on matters of fact to try and order them for our pragmatic
purposes.
Self-styled latter-day Humeans often attempt to give objective underpinnings
to the laws and probabilities in our models. The best systems approach takes
Humean laws to be the axioms in the best possible systematisation of the
totality of events, and Lewis’s ‘Subjectivist Guide’ is a manifesto for doing
so in the case of subjective probabilities.
But the Humean may well have no need of such objective underpinnings.
Radical subjectivists about probability have been saying so for a long time.
There is no sense in which probabilistic judgements are right or wrong, just
as there is no necessary connection between causes and effects. By and large
through a process similar to habituation (Bayesian conditioning!) we form
the idea of probabilistic connections, which then forms the basis of our further
reasonings about matters of fact. There is no guarantee that our expectations
will come out true, but these forms of reasoning have served us well.
For the subjectivist, or pragmatist, such are all our theoretical models of
science, including quantum mechanics. And we judge them in terms of the
standard criteria of science: first and foremost the empirical criterion of
past performance, as well as other criteria such as simplicity, expectation of
fruitfulness, and so on. In this sense, there are no objective chances in the
sense of strict Lewisian rationality, no objective laws nor objective modality
in either an anti-Humean or even neo-Humean sense, but merely in the sense
of the pragmatic rationality of science.
Indeed, the best systems analysis provides a plausible if schematic picture
of our inductive practices, but there is no point to applying it at the ‘end
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of time’, when we no longer need to project any predicates. Any laws that
we formulate along the way, any notions of modality that we construe are
only the result of analysing the epistemically available data, and as such are
only projections of what has been successful so far. From a Humean point
of view, this seems to me as it should be, just as Hume himself was content
with his sceptical solution to the problem of induction.
And, as a matter of fact, in the relatively neglected Section VI of the En-
quiry, Hume explicitly discusses probabilities in terms of forming expecta-
tions, again through habit, about what will happen in certain proportions of
cases. Thus Hume was perhaps the first de Finettian...
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